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ABSTRACT
The paper is an attempt to unveil the growth-development tradeoff in the Indian agriculture sector in 
light of some selected recent policy measures in presence of dualism in both agriculture sector and credit 
market. Segmentation of the agriculture sector is addressed as traded export agriculture and non-traded 
agriculture sector. The dualism in the credit market is the coexistence of the formal and informal credit 
market. In this paper, we construct a three-sector general equilibrium model which may apply to a 
large class of emerging market economies. The results of the paper reflect contradictions of an emerging 
economy which is essentially hybrid economics in which capitalist nucleus has a conditional-conditioning 
relationship with an archaic structure.
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Globalization has impacted the world economy 
through various channels that burdening developing 
economies with loads of liberalization policy 
measures. These combined policies of LPG marked 
a distinct line between growth and development. 
But in a country like India, where the agriculture 
and the allied sector continues to share a large 
chunk in employment share, liberalization had 
invited more criticism than buttering such policies. 
Our paper will be centered on the circumvented 
dimensions related to the agriculture sector and 
questions whether policies aimed at the growth 
of the agriculture sector output in GDP can 
escalate development? In this regard, a few facts 
are pertinent to our analysis. The exportable 
agricultural commodity has a share of 12.55% in the 
total national export of India in the year 2015-161. 
In agricultural production credit (both formal and 
informal) plays an important role besides the use 
of land and labour. The major channels through 
1Agricultural Statistics at a Glance 2016, page = 300.
which formal credit flows are Public Sector Banks 
(PSBs), Private Sector Banks, Cooperative Banks 
and Regional Rural Banks (RRBs). The volume of 
institutional credit flow in the agricultural sector 
in India had increased overtime that stands to 
` 877527 cr in the year 2015-16. The hidden fact 
is that the formal credit growth rate had dropped 
significantly in the post-NDA regime (post-2014)2. 
More than 50% of this formal credit is availed by 
the small and marginal farmers3 (although, sharp 
fall had been recorded in the Coverage of Small 
and Marginal Farmers (SMF) in Agriculture Ground 
level credit (GLC) flow in the last 3 years from 62.7% 
in 2013-14 to 60.1% in 2017-184). Still, 40% of the 
funds of farmers still come from informal sources 
(local moneylenders accounted for almost 26% 
share of total agricultural credit)5.The Government 
of India modified the Interest Subvention Scheme 
2Agricultural Statistics at a Glance 2016, page= 369.
3Agricultural Statistics at a Glance 2016 page=407.
4Economic Survey 2017-18, Vol.-II, page=114.
5Economic Survey 2015-16, Vol.-II, page=110.
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(ISS)6 in the year 2017-18 which will help farmers 
to avail of short-term crop loans up to ` 3 lakh 
payable within one year at only 4% interest rate per 
annum. The attitude of the Government seems to be 
agriculture friendly in face of Elections; however, a 
proper evaluation of such policies is imperative to 
assess the effectiveness of its targeted achievements.
Given this backdrop the present paper attempts to 
analyze the engagement of some selected populist 
policy measures mainly, credit subsidy reform and 
agriculture loan waiver that are directed towards 
achieving economic growth, with the performance 
in the agriculture sector (traded and non-traded), 
manufacturing sector, income inequality and few 
other related measures of development in presence 
of imperfection in the credit market. There are 
enormous pieces of literatures that modelled the 
credit market interlinkage in the agriculture sector 
as a partial equilibrium exercise, however there exist 
dearth of any General Equilibrium (GE) analysis 
pertaining to the linkage between the working of 
the credit market and its overall developmental 
implication. We consider a few related works that 
are relevant for our purpose. The seminal work of 
Gupta and Chaudhuri (1996) explored the effect 
of corruption that interrupts the working of the 
formal and informal credit market in the agriculture 
sector under two possibilities of linkage that is 
when either kind of credit is perfect substitute or 
complements. Extending in a similar line, Chaudhuri 
(1996) analyzed credit-product interlinkage under 
agriculture price uncertainty using a game theoretic 
approach. Chaudhuri (2001) maintained the baseline 
of credit market interlinkage, but introduced the 
existence of a vertical interlinkage between formal 
and informal credit market, in other words, it 
assumed that informal lender act as an intermediary 
between formal sector lender and farmers (final 
borrowers) thus influencing the informal interest 
rate that is shown to be an inverse function of 
formal interest rate. Chaudhuri and Dastidar 
(2011) introduced information asymmetry that is 
possessed by the informal moneylenders, which 
provided a condition for the collusion of all informal 
lenders and thus breaking the baseline concept of 
vertical interlinkage between formal-informal credit 
markets. Chaudhuri (2002) added another line 
to the existing junction of credit market analysis 
6Economic Survey 2017-18, Vol.-II, page=115.
by incorporating credit-labour interlinkage with 
the existence of credit-product interlinkage. The 
above mentioned literatures however despite their 
extensive depth in analyzing the credit market 
averted from consideration of the risk of lending 
that is a crucial feature of any credit market. This 
missing link had been explored by Basu (1997) 
that formalized several models of credit market by 
incorporating risk of lending using the Lender’s 
risk hypothesis. Unlike the above mentioned partial 
equilibrium analysis, the work of Banerjee and Nag 
(2015) is imperative to mention as an exception 
that uses a GE framework to analyze liberalization 
policies in presence of credit market interlinkage 
and its effect on income inequality and overall 
growth rate of economy which are otherwise 
not possible to capture in a partial equilibrium 
framework.
The present paper attempts to address the impact of 
reform policies in a three sector-four factor General 
Equilibrium structure complemented by a micro-
foundation to endogenize the supply function of 
informal credit and to explore formal-informal credit 
market linkage effect with developmental indicators. 
Our paper is a straight departure from Banerjee and 
Nag (2015) in several respects. First, unlike the 
assumption of substitutability between formal and 
informal credit as in Banerjee and Nag (2015), we 
assume that either type of credit is complement to 
each other and used in fixed proportion. The reason 
behind such a complementary relationship between 
formal and informal credit can be found in Gupta 
and Chaudhuri (1996)7. Second, our paper highlights 
the presence of the non-traded agriculture sector 
which is superseded in Banerjee and Nag (2015)8. 
Lastly, we incorporate the missing link of the risk 
of loan default in lending as in Basu (1997) but 
in a different fashion as moneylender’s utility 
maximizing behaviour.
The comparative statics performed in this paper 
are as follows. We analyze the effects of financial 
reform in terms of a uniform rise in institutional 
credit subsidy rate for crop loans, targeted credit 
7Farmers usually resort to formal borrowings to finance large costs or 
fixed cost, whereas informal borrowings are taken to meet petty seasonal 
expenses such as labour cost at the beginning of sowing season or at the 
end of harvest. Informal loans are also taken to meet self-consumption 
needs.
8The role of non-traded sector in any developing economy can be found 
mentioned in Achcharya and Marjit (2002), Marjit, Kar and Achcharya 
(2007).
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subsidy to the small non-traded agriculture, and 
moral hazard of farmers’ loan waiver policy in 
terms of an increase in the risk of the loan default 
rate. The effect of these policy consequences is 
shown for some development indices such as wage 
inequality, Gini Index, aggregate workers welfare 
index (using Sen (1974) index) and credit market 
exploitation index.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In 
section 2, we set up the basic model. In its sub-
section 2.1, we discuss the working of the informal 
credit market and derive the informal credit supply 
function as a partial equilibrium exercise. In sub-
section 2.2, we set up the General Equilibrium 
economy and discuss its properties. In sub-section 
2.3, we discuss some measure of development index 
and mould them to fit our assumed stylized small 
open economy. In section 3, we carry out a couple 
of comparative static exercises pertaining to our 
analysis of some recent policies pertaining to the 
agriculture sector. Section 4 concludes the paper.
The Model
In this section, we construct a three sector-four 
factor GE model that is motivated by the pioneer 
works of Jones (1965) and Jones (1971). The brief 
story is as follows. This is a small open developing 
economy with dualistic structure in Lewisian sense 
that is one rural sector and one urban sector. The 
urban region consists of the import manufacturing 
sector (sector M), whereas the rural region is shared 
by export intensive agriculture sector (sector X) 
and non-traded agriculture sector (sector Y). All 
three sectors use formal credit and informal credit. 
Skilled labour is specific to the urban region and 
unskilled labour is mobile only within the rural 
region. We assume that production structure is a 
fixed coefficient type, i.e. labour, formal capital and 
informal capital are used in exogenously determined 
fixed proportion. All factors earn their competitive 
return and there exist no unemployment of any 
factor. Output market is also perfectly competitive, 
technology is CRS and hence zero profit condition 
holds. Prices of the traded sector (sector M and 
sector X) are determined in the international market 
and are exogenous to the domestic economy. Price 
of the non-traded agriculture sector is domestically 
determined by forces of demand and supply. The 
demand for agriculture sector is generated from all 
the three sectors and we assume that all workers in 
the economy spend a fixed and uniform fraction of 
their aggregate income. Formal credit is subsidized 
in the rural region and its supply is institutionally 
determined9. However, we derive informal credit 
supply to be a positive function of informal interest 
rate and a negative function of the probability of 
loan default. This completes the general description 
of the stylized economy.
The Moneylender’s Tradeoff and the Informal 
Credit Supply Function
We consider an informal moneylender who 
maximizes his utility and the utility is assumed to 
be a positive function of his expected income (T) 
and risk-free investment opportunities (N)10. The 
utility function is given by
U = f (T, N), Uk > 0   for k = T, N …(1)
The utility function is assumed to be strictly 
quasiconcave and preferences are assumed to be 
convex, with all other standard properties satisfied.
The expected income of the moneylender is given 
by,
T = (1+r)N + (1 + i)(1–Pr)I … (2)
where, Pr ∈ [0,1]
Where Pr is the probability of loan default by the 
borrowers (or, the average loan default), then 1–Pr 
is the average rate of repayment by the borrowers. 
I is the amount of informal lending that is given by,
I = W – N …(3)
Substituting Eq. (3) into Eq. (2), we get
T = rN + (1 + i)(1–Pr)(W – N) … (2.1)
The equation obtained in (2.1) is amenable to 
an easy interpretation as follows. It states that 
moneylender’s total expected income is composed of 
fixed initial wealth (rN) and net income earned from 
9Credit subsidy is enjoyed by the export agriculture sector and non-traded 
agriculture sector. However, such credit is used by all the three sectors that 
include the manufacturing sector. To maintain our specificity of analysis, 
the manufacturing sector is devoid of any kind credit subsidy. Even if the 
urban sector is provided subsidized credit, the rate of subsidy will differ 
across rural and urban region.
10The risk-free investment opportunities are those investments that are safe 
such as bank savings (fixed deposits) and involve no uncertainty on its 
return. These are opposite to risk associated investment such as informal 
lending as in the present case.
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informal lending at given informal interest rate (i). 
Equation (2.1) can be thus viewed as moneylender’s 
budget constraint. The informal moneylender 
maximizes Eq. (1) subject to his constraint in Eq. 
(2.1). The two choice variables involved in the 
optimization process are T and N. Once the optimal 
value of T* and N* is obtained, we get the supply 
of informal lending I from Eq. (3). Thus from the 
entire optimization exercise, we get the informal 
credit supply function as,11
( ) ( ) ( )r
Pi r
I I
−−+
 
=    
 …(4)
Eq. (4) shows that informal credit supply is 
positively related to informal interest rate, and 
negatively related to formal interest rate and the 
probability of loan default.
The General Equilibrium Structure
The following symbols are used in the model.
akj = input (k)  to output (j) ratio γ = credit subsidy rate
WS =skilled labour wage rate S = skilled labour endowment
W=unskilled wage rate λkj = kth factor share in jth sector 
outptut
r = administered formal interest 
rate
L = unskilled labour endowment
i = interest rate on informal 
credit
I(∙) = informal credit supply
PM* = world price of import 
competing good
M,X,Y = sectoral outputs
PX* = world price of export 
agriculture good
PY = price of non-traded 
agriculture good
α = proportion of income spent 
on good Y
θkj = value share of k
th input in 
the jth sector
The production structure of the three sectors are 
described by the following equations,
� � ��� � ���� ,
�
��� ,
�
����													(5.1)
� � ��� � ���� ,
�
��� ,
�
����																(5.2)
� � ��� � ���� ,
�
��� ,
�
����																(5.3)�
��
�
��
�
  …(5)
Using the equations in Eq.(5) and given factor 
11See Appendix (A) for detailed optimization process and derivation of in-
formal credit supply function.
returns and output level and prices we get zero profit 
conditions for each sector in partial equilibrium and 
aggregating them in general equilibrium we get the 
following set of equations.
aSM WS + aFM r + aIM i = PM*  …(6)
aLX W + aFX (1–γ1) r + aIX i = PX* …(7)
aLY W + aFY (1–γ2) r + aIY i = PY …(8)
aSM M = S  …(9)
aLX X + aLY Y = L  …(10)
aFM M + aFX X + aFY Y = F + KF  …(11)
aIM M + aIX X + aIY Y = I(i,Pr,r)  …(12)
α(WS S + WL) = PY Y, where 0 < α < 1 …(13) 
FX FY
LX LY
θ θ
θ θ
>  …(B.a)
LX LY
IX IY
θ θ
θ θ
>  …(B.b)
Equations (6)-(8) gives the three zero profit 
conditions. Equations (9)-(12) give the full 
employment conditions of all factors. Equation 
(13) gives the demand-supply for good Y. In 
other words, Eq. (13) states that α fraction of total 
labour income that is aggregate of skilled labour 
income and unskilled labour income is spent on 
the total value produced by sector Y. It is assumed 
that r is Central Bank’s policy instrument that is 
determined exogenously. The endogenous variables 
are WS,W,i,KF,X,Y,M,PY,I and policy parameters 
are γ1,γ2,Pr. Since, there are three factor prices & 
one endogenized price of sector Y and three price 
systems, the model does not possess decomposition 
property. From Eq.(6) and Eq. (7) we can solve for W 
and WS as a function of i. From Eq. (8) we get i as a 
function of PY. Eq.(9) solves for M and Eq. (10)-(12) 
solves for X and Y as a function of PY. In Eq.(13) we 
are left with one equation with one unknown PY. 
Thus, Eq. (9) by equating demand and supply we 
solve for PY. Eq. (11) solves for KF. Conditions (B.a) 
and (B.b) implies the assumption that sector X is 
formal credit intensive relative to labour and labour 
intensive relative to informal credit respectively 
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compared to sector Y12. The model is stable in the 
sense that Walrasian stability is satisfied13. This 
completes the determination of the model.
Measurement of Growth and Development
Recent economic theory marks development distinct 
from traditional growth measures. In our paper we 
measure developmental implication for changes 
in policy parameters by constructing four indices, 
namely, wage inequality index (IINQ), credit market 
exploitation index (E), Gini Indix (G) and workers 
welfare index (HW)14. 
COMPARATIVE STATIC EXERCISES
In this section, we carry out a couple of comparative 
statics exercises14 pertaining to our analysis of 
few selected policies recently adopted by the 
Government as set goals delivered to curb the 
backwardness of Indian agriculture.
Input Subsidy schemes
After recent policy debates on the efficiency of 
Farm loan waiver schemes, it has been argued 
that input subsidy reforms either directly in terms 
of credit subsidy such as Interest Subvention 
Scheme or indirectly as subsidy in the purchase 
price of fertilizers or seeds are more efficient and 
sustaining measures. However, the debate averts 
from an important policy issue that is whether 
credit subsidy is to be provided to the small non-
traded agriculture sector or large export intensive 
agriculture, this crucially turns upside down the 
expected predictions.
Let us first consider targeted input subsidy to the 
small non-traded agriculture. This implies a rise in 
γ2 and hence associated fall in the cost of formal 
credit in sector Y. Thus, for given price  PY sector 
Y demands more informal credit and labour that 
is released by sector X. Given factor intensity, 
sector Y’s demand for labour (informal credit) 
is proportionately lower (higher) than sector X’s 
release of labour (informal credit) thus there exist 
excess labour (deficit of informal credit) requiring a 
fall (rise) in wage rate W (informal interest i). Sector 
12The factor-intensity conditions can be jointly expressed as 
FX LX IX
FY LY IY
θ θ θ
θ θ θ
> >
13See Appendix (E) for the mathematical derivation of stability of the mod-
el.
14See Appendix for detailed mathematical derivation.
Y thus expands and given demand, price PY falls. 
Following Stolper-Samuelson(SS) theorem i falls and 
W rises. Thus, there are two effects on i, first, i rises 
due to direct fall in γ2 effect and second i falls due to 
price effect. If the direct lower cost effect dominates 
the price effect then informal interest rate i rises and 
hence W falls. In manufacturing sector (sector M) 
to maintain zero profit WS falls. However, output 
in sector M does not changes since it is already 
determined from its specific factor input of skilled 
labour endowment. The following proposition is 
immediate.
Proposition 1: A specific credit subsidy given to the 
non-traded agriculture sector leads to an expansion of 
the non-traded agriculture output and contraction of the 
exportable agriculture output, and depresses wage rate 
of either type of labour.
Proposition 2: Specific credit subsidy worsens wage 
inequality between skilled and unskilled workers, 
raises credit market exploitation and worsens aggregate 
workers’ welfare.
Now, consider a uniform rate of subsidy to both 
the traded agriculture sector X and non-traded 
agriculture sector Y. This is implied by 1 2ˆ ˆ ˆ 0γ γ γ= = > . 
Following the same logic and working principle of 
the model under the given set of factor intensities 
condition we have the following result.
�
�
�
�
� ��� > 0�̂ � 0����|������� � ���������| > ������
�� � 0������� > 0
�� > 0����� �� > 0
 
Proposition 3: A uniform subsidy rate to both traded 
and non-traded agriculture sector leads to expansion of 
the traded agriculture sector at the cost to non-traded 
local output producing agriculture sector. Labour gains 
in terms of higher wage rate.
Proposition 4: Uniform subsidy rate leads to lower wage 
inequality, lower credit market exploitation and improved 
workers’ welfare.
Loan Waiver Schemes
Governments usually resort to loan waiver schemes 
as a last response to farmers’ resentment due to 
the neglect of the agriculture sector. Such schemes 
lead to issues related to moral hazard whereby 
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productive farmers deliberately default their 
loan. Also, farmers producing local non-traded 
agricultural output prefer to raise consumption 
from money saved from loan waiver instead of 
investing it in farm activities. Thus the rate of loan 
default spikes up further. In our model, it is implied 
by ˆ 0rP > . The following effects are obtained for the 
variables.
�
��
�
��
� ��� > 0�̂ > 0		
�� < 0	�				��� < 0
�� < 0			��			���|�̂| < ���� �	��� �		
	�� > 0
�� < 0		��		��� > ���
 
Proposition 5: A loan waiver policy is not beneficial for 
the non-traded agriculture sector if the moneylender’s 
sensitiveness (averseness) to the risk of loan default 
is relatively higher than its sensitiveness to informal 
interest rate, however, it is beneficial to the traded 
agriculture sector. Also, workers unambiguously loose 
in terms of lower wage rate.
Proposition 6: Loan waivers policy worsens wage 
inequality 15, escalates credit market exploitation rate and 
deteriorate workers welfare.
CONCLUSION AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS
The paper attempted to develop a theoretical 
understanding of some recent policy issues 
pertaining to the agriculture sector that presents 
crucial tradeoffs between growth and development, 
and also unveils that policies like targeted credit 
subsidy schemes or the loan waiver policy may 
produce counterproductive outcomes that have 
a conditional-conditioning relationship with an 
antiquated structure. Towards this, the paper 
developed a three sector General Equilibrium 
model in presence of credit market dualism. The 
paper obtained that a targeted credit subsidy policy 
accentuates aggregate real output growth rate of the 
non-traded backward agriculture, however, at the 
cost to development indicators. It leads to worsening 
of workers’ welfare index, aggravates credit market 
15Wage inequality worsens provided the sufficient condition 
IX IM
LX SM
θ θ
θ θ
> , 
it implies that value of expenditure share on skilled labour (informal credit) 
in sector M is relatively higher (lower) than sector X.
exploitation rate and depresses wage rate of both 
skilled and unskilled workers. On the other hand, 
it is also obtained that a loan waiver policy may 
not be the panacea for agriculture distress. A loan 
waiver policy in the model is reflected as a rise in 
loan default rate due to moral hazard effect and the 
following counterproductive results were obtained. 
First, if the agrarian sector is characterized such 
as the export-intensive agriculture is endowed 
with a relatively larger share of the labour force 
compared to the share of informal credit than 
the local non-traded agriculture, then it would 
reduce aggregate agricultural output of the non-
traded agriculture sector and would lead to an 
expansion of the traded agriculture sector output. 
Second, the aggregate workers’ welfare worsens. 
Third, it leads to an escalation of the credit market 
exploitation index thus widening the gap between 
the informal interest rate and formal interest rate. 
These counterproductive outcomes are observed in 
the model because of the presence of the informal 
moneylender in the system that necessitates a 
proper evaluation of cost-benefit analysis before 
implementing such policies. As an alternative, 
it is very much evident from the model that a 
uniform credit subsidy policy produces more 
desirable outcomes. Also other policy measures 
such as developing agriculture infrastructure, 
spreading modern and scientific agriculture literacy, 
development of e-mandis (markets) can serve as an 
alternative to the archaic policy measures.
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APPENDIX 
A. Derivation of informal credit supply function
� = �(���)�										�� > 0� �� > 0																																																				(�� �) 
� = �� − �																																																																																																(�� �) 
� = (� � �)� � (� � �)(� − ��)(�� − �)																																																				(�� �) 
���
��� 				� = �(�� �)
�������	���			� = (� � �)� � (� � �)(� − ��)(�� − �)
																																� (�� �) 
Now setting up Lagrangian in the constrained maximization process, 
� = �(���) � �{� − (� � �)� − (� � �)(� − ��)(�� − �)}																															(�� �) 
The first order conditions (F.O.C’s) are, 
��
�� = �� � � = 0																																																																																											(�� ���) 
��
�� = �� � �{−(� � �) � (� � �)(� − ��)} = 0																																																	(�� ���) 
��
�� = � − (� � �)� − (� � �)(� − ��)(�� − �) = 0																																											(�� ���) 
Dividing equation (A.5.2) by equation (A.5.1) we get, 
��
�� =
(� � �)(� − ��) − (� � �)																																																																													(�� �) 
Solving F.O.C’s and equation (�� �) we derived the informal credit supply function as, 
� = � � ��(−)		,
�
(+)	,
�
(−)�																																																								 
B. Equations of  Change
General condition 
Factor intensity using Jones (1965) 
���
��� >
���
��� 		or	
���
��� >
���
��� 					
(�� �)
���
��� >
���
��� 		or	
���
��� >
���
��� 					
(�� �)
Totally differentiating equation (6) we get, 
�����
��∗ 			
	����� +
����
��∗ 			
	��� = 0																																																				 
���	�� + ���	�̂ = 0																																																															(�� �) 
Similarly totally differentiating equation (7) and equation (8) respectively we get, 
���	�� − ������� + ���	�̂ = 0																																						(�� �) 
���	�� − ���	����� + ���	�̂ = ��																																						(�� �) 
Totally differentiating equation (9) to equation (11) respectively we get, 
�� = 0																																																																																																															(�� �) 
���	�� + ���	�� = 0																																																																																																					 
�� = − ������ 	�
�																																																																																																				(�� �) 
���	�� + ���	�� = �	�� + (� − �)	��			� ��ere	� =
�
� + ��		
																			(�� �)																				 
���	�� + ���	�� = 	 ���	�̂ + ����	��� 																																																																		 
��ere	��� =
�	�(�� ��)
�	� 	
�
�(�� ��)		 � for	� = ��	� ���			�		��� � 0� ���� < 0										 
�ere� ��� = elasicity	of	informal	credit	su��ly	�it�	res�ect	to	�aria�le	�											
�	�� + (� − �)	�� = �� + ��			� ��ere	� =
�	��	�
��	� 					�			0 < � < �													
(�� �)
From (B.1) we get, 
�� = −
���
��� 	�̂																(�� ���)
From (B.2) we get, 
�� = ������ ���� −
���	
��� �̂														(�� ���)
From (B.3) we get, 
�̂ = � ����������������� �� +
�
(�������������)
		 � ��ere		� = ����������� − ����������			(�� ���)	
From (B.5) we get, 
�� = − ������ �
�																(�� ���)
From (B.7) we get, 
�� = ����	�̂ + ����	��
� ����	
(������ � ���	���) 																						(�� ���)
From (B.8) 
(� � �) ������ ���� � � �
��
(������ � ������) = �� �� +
����
(������ � ������)�			
�here	� = ���������	(����������	���) 	and	� = �
������
(����������	���)
+ ������� + (� � �)
���
���
�													(�� ���)
From (B.6) 
�� =
�� �(������ � ���	���)��� � � �	�
�
(� � �) 															(�� ���)
C. Measures of Growth and Development
C.1. Wage Inequality Index 
The wage inequality is given by the relative skilled-unskilled wage ratio i.e. 
��
� = ����
Taking log on both sides and totally differentiation we get,
���� � ���� = �� ��� 																																																																																																																					
If		 ���� > 0	then	income	inequality	increases���� < 0	then	income	inequality	decreases�																																																					(�� ���)						
C.2. Gini Index 
Let, there are � distinct incomes in the economy and in each income class �, the number of 
individuals earning that income is denoted by ��. So, total number of individual is given by, 
� = ∑ ������ .	Then � (the average income)is    
� = 1����	��
�
���
, where	y�	is	�he	in�ome	earned	by	��h	in�ome	�rou�
So, the Gini Index is defined as, 
� = 	 1�	��	� 	����	��	��� � ���
�
���
�
���
		 , � � � � 1																																																														(�. �.1)	
In our model, 
� = �,				�� = number	of	skilled	labour,				�� = number	of	unskilled	labour
�� = ��, �� = �, � = � � �, � =
��	� ��	�
�� � �� 									
So, in our model � takes the form,
� = �	�	|�� ��|�� � �����	� ��	��
																																																																																								(�. �.1.1)
C.3. Workers’ Welfare Index 
The workers’ welfare index (Sen, 1974) is given by,
�� � �	�	(� � �)																																																																																																										(�� ���)
Substituting the values for �, �	and	�
�� � �� � �� �
��	� ��	�
� � � � �� �
�	�	|�� ��|
�� � �����	� ��	��
�																											(�� �����)
�� � ���	� ��	�� � �
�	�	|�� ��|
�� � �� �																																																																(�� �����)
Taking	total	differential	we	get,																																																																																											
��	�� � ���	��	�� �� �
�
�� � ��� � ��
� 	�	�� �� � ��� � ���																														
																																											�����	 �� � ��� � ��� � �	���	 �� �
�
�� � ��� � �													(�� �����)
C.4. Credit Market Exploitation 
It is given by the relative ratio of informal interest rate to formal interest rate i.e. 
�
�̅ � �
Taking log on both sides and totally differentiating we get,  
� � �̂ � �̂		, ��	 � � �	�ean�	�redit	e��loitation	rate	in�rea�e�� � �	�ean�	�redit	e��loitation	rate	de�rea�e��																						(�� ���)
D. Comparative static results
D.1.   (�� > 0)
From equation (B.8.1) we get �� < 0. From equatio (B.3.1) we get	�̂ > 0 if |�������� | >
����.  From equation (B.7.1), (B.5.1), (B.2.1) and (B.1.1) we get �� > 0, �� < 0,�� <
0	���	�� < 0 respectively. Then from equation (B.6.1) we get �� < 0.
Now, on the basis of these results we can find out the effects on development indices.  
From equation (C.1.1) we can say that ���� is ambiguous. 
From equation (C.3.1.3) we get that �� < 0.
From equation (C.4.1) it is evident that � > 0.
D.2 .  (�� � �� > 0)
By the similar process (discussed in D.1) it is determined that, 
�� > 0, �̂ < 0	iff	|�| > ����, �� < 0, �� > 0,�� > 0	���	�� > 0,	�� > 0
����	i�	���i�����, �� > 0, � < 0																	
D.3. (�� > 0)
By the similar process (discussed in D.1) it is determined that, 
�� > 0, �̂ > 0, �� > 0	iff	���|	�̂| > ����	���� 	�, �� < 0,�� < 0	���	�� < 0,	�� < 0	,
���� > 0		��		
θ��
θ�� >
θ��
θ�� �				�� < 0, � > 0		
E. Derivation of stability condition
Excess Demand is defined as, 
�� � �	���	� ��	���� � �													
(�� �) 
For	stability	we	require						 �	���	�� < 0 
Proof:- 
Differentiating both sides of (E.1) by �� we get, 
�	��
�	�� =
�� ��	 ��	���	�	�� + �
��	
�	���� − �	���	� +�	��
���
− �	��	�� 
=>	 ����
���	�	����
+�
� 	�	�
��
� − ����
���	� +�	�� −
��	�
��	��	
 
Substituting the values for ��		���	�� ,	we get, 
=>	 �	��	��
	�−������� 	�̂ −
(1 − �)���
��� 		�̂ − �
�� − 	�	��	 
Substituting �̂ the expression finally boils down to, 
�	��
�	�� = −
�
	�� �
1
(������ − ������) �
�������
��� +
(1 − �)��� +
���������
(������ − ���	���)� + 1� 
                                                                                                                                               (E.2)
Given the factor intensity conditions (B.a. and B.b.),  Walrasian stability condition is satisfied 	
	�. �.			 �	���	�� < 0		. 
 

